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INTRODUCTION

W

ILLIAM Blackstone famously proclaimed, “nothing strikes . . .
the imagination, and affects and engages the affections of
mankind, as the right of property.”1 Within the realm of property
law, the same can be said about the takings power.2 This extraordinary power has captured the hearts and minds of generations of
property scholars who have sought to justify the power and elucidate its limitations.
The accepted lore among academics is that the takings power is
necessary to enable socially beneficial development projects.3
Without the power to force private property owners to transfer
their title to the government, many desirable projects would be undermined by various holdouts. Without a mechanism like eminent
domain, these desirable projects would grind to a halt.
The standard justification gives rise to a formidable challenge of
a different kind: how does society ensure that politicians do not
abuse the takings power? As elected officials, politicians are supposed to act in the best interest of the public. As individuals, how1
2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 2 (Univ. of Chi.
Press 1979) (1766).
2
There have been many notable works in the vast literature on takings. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain
(1985) (examining the Takings Clause in a range of contexts and in connection with
the role of the individual and the state); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80
Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967) (analyzing the justifications for compensation in takings
cases and proposing a fairness test).
3
See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent
Domain, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 101, 138–39 (2006).
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ever, they may prefer to promote their narrow self-interest rather
than the interest of the public at large. Even well-meaning politicians may often act out of mixed motives and adopt policies that
are not optimal for their constituents.
Consequently, the desirability of the takings power critically depends on the law’s ability to negate the self-interest of politicians
and thereby align their interests with those of the public at large. In
this Essay, we argue that the main function of the compensation
requirement, which has thus far eluded academic attention, is to
provide a meaningful check on politicians’ ability to abuse the takings power. Properly designed, the compensation mandate can go a
long way toward protecting the public from abuse of the takings
power and ensuring that it is only used to promote the interest of
the public at large.
In a world without legally mandated compensation, politicians
could exercise the takings power whenever doing so would yield
them a personal profit, irrespective of the needs of the public at
large. In such an environment, they could engage in various deals
with developers that would enrich them and their partners at the
expense of the general public. In other words, they could use the
takings power to transfer wealth from the politically disempowered
to the politically powerful. In this world, corruption would be rampant and property rights weak. Mandatory compensation dramatically reduces the profits politicians can derive from takings. As a
result, it takes away much of the incentive to use the takings power
to private ends and refocuses their attention on the public good.
This line of analysis yields a new and powerful justification for
the constitutional compensation requirement. Inspired by public
choice theory, we argue that takings compensation is intended to
reduce the incentives for corruption by limiting the ability of politicians to profit from takings.
As we show, our theory not only adds an additional reason for
requiring that the government compensate owners whose property
is taken; it also yields important insights into the optimal structure
of takings compensation. First, we show that current incentives to
use eminent domain excessively in the service of private developers
cannot be blunted by modifying compensation policy. These undesirable incentives can be reduced or eliminated only by a separate
policy that involves charging developers for the benefits they re-
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ceive. Second, we show that overcompensation is even worse than
under-compensation insofar as corruption is concerned. For this
reason, we should look skeptically at laws requiring the payment of
a fixed percentage bonus above market value to property condemnees. Additionally, market value compensation might be attractive, notwithstanding its shortcomings, where judges are
thought systematically to overrate the subjective value owners attach to their properties. Third, we show why a private insurance
system for compensating property owners for takings is not only
impractical but undesirable, as it could also encourage political
corruption.
Our Essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, we analyze the existing
justifications of the compensation requirement, with particular attention to those sounding in public choice. In Part II, we present
and develop our new corruption-reducing justification for takings
compensation and explain how it differs from preexisting justifications. In Part III, we explore the descriptive and normative implications of our corruption-reducing approach to legal policy. The
Appendix provides a more formal model of our theory.
I. THEORIES OF TAKINGS COMPENSATION
The task of justifying takings compensation has preoccupied
generations of property scholars.4 Elementary fairness seems to

4

See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private,
59 Stan. L. Rev. 871 (2007) (offering a mechanism by which property owners could be
fully compensated); James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit
on Eminent Domain, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1277, 1279 (1985) (arguing for limits on the
government’s power of eminent domain and government reimbursement for all large,
concrete, and compensable costs resulting from takings); Daryl J. Levinson, Making
Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 345 (2000) (arguing that compensation remedies do not adequately deter
constitutional violations by the government and other justifications for compensation
are inadequate); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much Is
Just?, 42 Cath. U. L. Rev. 721, 724–25 (1993) (finding that courts have been inconsistent in applying the Takings Clause and identifying standards by which compensation
should be measured); Thomas J. Miceli, Compensation for the Taking of Land Under
Eminent Domain, 147 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 354 (1991) (proposing an
economic model to address the moral hazard that occurs when landowners believe
they will be undercompensated in a government takings and thus overinvest in their
land); Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for
Regulatory Takings, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 677, 680–81 (2005) (arguing the level of
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demand compensating those harmed by government action.5 But
the fact is that most government actions that harm citizens—from
school closings to tax changes6—do not entitle the affected citizens
to compensation. Even where the law mandates compensation, it
often fails to pay for various harms suffered by aggrieved property
owners.7 For example, owners who lose their property in eminent
domain actions receive only the market value of the taken property
even where the owner has developed a particular emotional attachment that exceeds the market price.8 Understanding the justifications for takings compensation is therefore vitally important for
deciding when and how much compensation should be paid.
A. Fairness Justifications for Takings Compensation
Basic fairness is the most intuitively obvious reason for demanding that the state compensate owners whose property it takes. The
Supreme Court pronounced this fairness-based justification for the
compensation requirement in Armstrong v. United States,9 where
the Court wrote:
The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not
be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
10
the public as a whole.

proper compensation is directly related to how effectively the damages awards can
fulfill the goals of the Takings Clause).
5
Cf. Michelman, supra note 2, at 1171–72, 1235 (arguing that the correct test for
compensation is whether it is fair).
6
Cf. Eduardo Moisés Penalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2182, 2251
(2004) (arguing against compensation for takings that are indistinguishable from permissible taxes and suggesting courts should take harm into account when determining
whether and how much compensation should be paid).
7
See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 885–90; Lee Anne Fennell, Taking
Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 957, 958–59 (2004); Garnett, supra
note 3, at 106–10; James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 Mich. St.
L. Rev. 859, 866 (2004); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 Cornell
L. Rev. 61, 82–83 (1986).
8
See Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988).
9
364 U.S. 40 (1960).
10
Id. at 49.

BELL&PARCHOMOVSKY: HIDDEN FUNCTION

1678

Virginia Law Review

10/18/2010 8:49 PM

[Vol. 96:1673

Frank Michelman elaborated on this fairness justification in his
seminal 1967 article, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law.11 Using John
Rawls’s framework for analyzing questions of justice, Michelman
argued that compensation should be considered fair when it represents the compensation requirement that the citizenry would have
chosen behind a veil of ignorance. Michelman claimed that if the
citizenry knew of a governmental power of eminent domain in the
abstract but did not know how that power would be exercised and
the burdens distributed among the general public, it would nevertheless have a shared sense of the ideal “fair” scope of compensation.12 Michelman argued that this shared notion of an acceptable
risk of exposure to eminent domain and shared sense of “fair”
compensation should serve as the baseline for judging whether
compensation is just. It is generally believed that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York13 drew heavily from Michelman’s analysis.14
Essentially, Michelman believed that citizens would not be willing to leave their property fully vulnerable to government taking.15
Yet Michelman also believed that citizens would feel that some risk
of eminent domain was acceptable—that is, Michelman’s citizenry
would accept the possibility of some takings being carried out
without compensation.16 In addition, Michelman believed that in
some cases, the citizenry would consent to a rule of only partial
compensation. Less-than-full compensation would be appropriate
where, “it could be shown that some other rule should be expected
to work out best for each person insofar as his interests are affected by the social undertakings giving rise to occasions of compensation.”17
11

Michelman, supra note 2.
Id. at 1221–22.
13
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
14
Steven J. Eagle, The Rise and Rise of “Investment-Backed Expectations,” 32 Urb.
Law. 437, 437–38 (2000) (“The takings-determination phase of investment-backed expectations spans the period from its origination in a seminal 1967 article by Harvard
law professor Frank Michelman, through its incorporation into constitutional jurisprudence by Justice Brennan in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York . . . .”) (footnotes omitted).
15
Michelman, supra note 2, at 1214–24.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 1221.
12
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Michelman did not suffice with general remarks about shared
senses of fair risk of eminent domain and just compensation.
Michelman sought to sketch a quasi-utilitarian calculus for determining what the citizenry would consider a fair compensation policy. On the one hand, Michelman proposed that compensation
ought to be paid when the gains from the government action are
dubious, the settlement costs (that is, the costs of arranging for
compensation) are low, and “the harm concentrated on one individual is unusually great.”18 On the other hand, Michelman argued
that it would be fair to deny compensation when property owners
who are burdened by the government action also benefit from it or
when the burden falls on the shoulders of many people.19
The fairness justification has proved difficult to translate into
doctrine. The imprecision of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Penn
Central has been strongly criticized, and litigants and scholars continue to struggle over the definition of government actions that require compensation and those that do not.20 In addition, even as
“equal treatment justification remains today the most widespread
explanation for the compensation requirement,”21 critics like
Nestor Davidson argue that it “has thin theoretical grounding and
troubling doctrinal consequences.”22
Saul Levmore offered an interesting variation on the fairness
justification that tied it to some of the concerns of the next Section.
Approaching the problem of political process and interest groups
from a different direction, Levmore attempted to distinguish between compensable and non-compensable regulation by focusing

18

Id. at 1223.
Id. Subsequent commentators have interpreted Michelman’s analysis as suggesting that government pay compensation when demoralization costs exceed settlement
costs but not otherwise. Interestingly, this does not appear explicitly in Michelman’s
article. See David A. Dana & Thomas W. Merrill, Property Takings 35–36 (2002).
20
The debate is generally phrased as identifying the difference between a government action that constitutes a taking—either a regulatory taking or a physical taking—and one that does not constitute a taking. For a collection of some of the many
articles criticizing the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 Va. L. Rev. 277, 284–89
(2001).
21
Dana & Merrill, supra note 19, at 33–34.
22
Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1,
3–4 (2008).
19
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on the effects of the political process on minorities.23 Echoing the
concern voiced in Armstrong v. United States, Levmore wrote that
the takings power was always vulnerable to a fear that the government might use its regulatory power to benefit strong interest
groups.24 While Levmore argued that the strong minorities or majorities might protect themselves in the political process, disempowered minorities would be left without political recourse.25 Thus,
Levmore summarized:
A central theme of takings law is that protection is offered
against the possibility that majorities may mistreat minorities. A
paradigmatic case is that of a community of landowners who
combine to expropriate the property of one landowner for their
community’s enjoyment. Such majoritarian, or gang, law is
thought unfair because of an equal treatment principle, which is
especially compelling when the community’s needs would be met
just as well by using any piece of land, or because of the realistic
fear that the ganging up will too often be at the expense of the
26
neighbor who is most different or most nonconforming.

Levmore took these conclusions to a quite different conclusion
than that offered by Michelman. Rather than focusing on settlement and demoralization costs of takings, Levmore suggested focusing on the size and political power of affected groups. Thus, for
example, Levmore suggested that compensation is necessary where
the government orders rent control schemes aimed at mobile home
owners where there are very few mobile home parks in the jurisdiction, or “price or wage controls directed at one business, rather
than at an entire industry (or at the economy as a whole).”27 By
contrast, wrote Levmore, “controls that do not go so far as to deny
a minimal market rate of return and that are applied to an entire
industry or economy are just the sort of thing that is resolved in the

23

Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 Conn. L. Rev. 285, 292–93
(1990).
24
Id. at 306–07, 310–11.
25
Id. at 306–07.
26
Id. at 309.
27
Id. at 313.
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political arena where most of the affected parties are represented.”28
B. Public Choice Justifications for Takings Compensation
Many scholars have supplemented the fairness understanding of
takings compensation with additional theories grounded in an institutional understanding of government. In this Section, we closely
examine the primary justifications for the compensation requirement of takings law offered in the public choice literature: overcoming fiscal illusion and politically powerful condemnees. Finally,
we examine whether there have been earlier corruption-reducing
theories of takings compensation.
Public choice is the branch of economic analysis that studies political problems, and, especially, the decisionmaking of the state.29
As such, it represents a fertile ground for understanding why the
law should mandate that the state pay compensation for its actions
that are considered takings.
To date, public choice theorists have advanced two primary justifications for the compensation requirement. First, some scholars
have argued that government decisionmaking is susceptible to fiscal illusion, namely, the claimed tendency of government decisionmakers to ignore all costs that do not find expression in the
government budget.30 The second justification advanced by some
public choice scholars is that compensation helps ameliorate certain kinds of interest group pressures. This justification relies on
Mancur Olson’s seminal work on the power of interest groups in
controlling government decisionmaking.31 Olson’s work suggests
that small, well-organized groups can influence political processes
to capture benefits at the expense of larger but more poorly organ28

Id.
See generally Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice III (2003).
30
See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 881–84; Lawrence Blume & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 569,
620–22 (1984); Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U.
Envtl. L.J. 110, 131–32 (2002); see also William A. Fischel, Takings and Public Choice:
The Persuasion of Price, in 2 The Encyclopedia of Public Choice 549 (Charles Rowley
& Friedrich Schneider eds., 2003) (discussing how the government determines just
compensation).
31
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups (5th ed. 1975).
29
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ized groups.32 Theories influenced by Olson have appeared in several different variants, as presented below.
We conclude this Section with a discussion of Richard Epstein’s
theory of the Takings Clause and its possible connection to a rentminimizing theory of takings compensation.33 While Epstein’s theory is not generally viewed as belonging to the public choice
genre,34 Thomas Merrill saw Epstein’s requirement that all government action meet the conditions of Pareto optimality identified
by welfare economics as an implicit endorsement of a connection
between takings compensation and political rent-seeking.35 Epstein’s theory provides a useful comparative baseline for the corruption-minimizing theory of takings compensation we advance in
Part II.
1. Fiscal Illusion
Fiscal illusion is perhaps the most common economic explanation of the constitutional mandate of just compensation.36 Those
who believe in fiscal illusion believe that government actors are
generally well-intentioned and well-informed and make good decisions, but for a blind spot from which they all suffer. The blind spot
(or fiscal illusion) concerns costs that do not directly affect government revenues and expenditures. Government actors operating
under fiscal illusion are focused on the costs and benefits of government decisions, but only those costs and benefits that appear in
their governmental budget. These government actors are blind to
any costs their actions impose on private property owners save
those that appear on the budget (such as lower tax yields or administrative costs). Scholars who believe in fiscal illusion justify the
compensation requirement as a corrective to government actors’
vision problems. Constitutionally required just compensation
32

See id. at 3.
See Epstein, supra note 2.
34
Epstein’s work is generally seen as based upon a Lockean conception of property
and the state. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings: An Appreciative Retrospective, 15
Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 439, 443 (2006); William W. Fisher III, The Significance of
Public Perceptions of the Takings Doctrine, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1774, 1782 (1988).
35
Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1561, 1562 (1986) (book review). We discuss the meaning of rent-seeking in Subsection I.B.4, infra.
36
See generally Dana & Merrill, supra note 19, at 41–46.
33

BELL&PARCHOMOVSKY: HIDDEN FUNCTION

2010]

Hidden Function of Takings Compensation

10/18/2010 8:49 PM

1683

forces the government to place in its budget the costs incurred by
private property owners. This brings those costs into the field of vision of government actors that otherwise suffer from fiscal illusion,
and thus prevents excessive takings.
The fiscal illusion justification provides, at best, only a partial
explanation for current compensation doctrine and practice. Specifically, it suffers from the two following shortcomings. First, it is
at odds with the legally mandated compensation standard: compensation at market value.37 Taken to its logical conclusion, the fiscal illusion justification calls for a more generous compensation
measure than that currently employed, namely compensation at
subjective value. These numbers are not generally identical. Many
owners realize greater value from their property than market price.
Oftentimes, it is precisely this greater value that led the owners to
purchase the property and to hold it thereafter. For a variety of
reasons explored in the literature, one should often expect a subjective value that exceeds market value.38 That is, in general, we
expect that owners of property attach a greater value to their property than does the average person in the broader market. Since the
fiscal illusion theory is concerned with full accounting for costs and
benefits, the only measure that reflects the full cost of government
projects is not payment of market value to the aggrieved owners
but rather the payment of compensation at the owners’ subjective
value, which reflects their true loss as a result of the coercive transfer.39 Compensation at market value, in other words, leaves subjective losses out of the government budget and, therefore, invisible
to government actors suffering from fiscal illusion.
Second, the fiscal illusion justification, at least in its pure form,
stands for the proposition that under no circumstances will com37

See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943) (“In an effort . . . to find
some practical standard, the courts early adopted, and have retained, the concept of
market value.”); Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th
Cir. 1988) (“‘[J]ust compensation’ has been held to be satisfied by payment of market
value.”).
38
See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 885–90 (finding the subjective value
may exceed market value due to surplus subjective value, goodwill, community premiums, and transaction costs); see also Krier & Serkin, supra note 7, at 866; Symposium, The Death of Poletown: the Future of Eminent Domain and Urban Development After County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 837 (2004).
39
For further discussion of the importance of compensation at subjective value, see
Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 872–75.
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pensation be rendered voluntarily without the constitutional requirement. After all, any time the state compensates individuals it
adds costs to the state’s budget without adding any corresponding
revenue. This proposition is manifestly, empirically false. The Constitution does not require compensation for all regulations that
harm private property value, but such regulations are often still accompanied by voluntary state-offered compensation.40 The reason
for this is clear: political actors are anything but blind to costs
borne by the private sector to the exclusion of government. Excessive private costs translate in some degree into political costs for
political actors, and, hence, to diminished politician utility. For this
reason, it is also empirically false that politicians exclusively maximize budget surplus.
2. Condemnee Interest Groups
Focusing on property owners’ political grievances created by uncompensated takings has led to a different group of justifications of
the compensation requirement. We focus first on the version of this
school found in the work of Daniel Farber.41 Farber’s model envisions that socially efficient takings may be thwarted due to opposition from politically powerful property owners who can and will
stop the government from taking their properties unless they are
paid enough money to remove their opposition.42 Farber’s model,
in other words, sees compensation as a type of “bribery” to obstreperous, self-minded property owners to quiet them and pave
the way for socially efficient projects. In Farber’s view, the usual
case in which such compensation is necessary involves a small
number of affected properties to be taken, with widely spread public benefits. The owners of the properties targeted for taking will
comprise a well-motivated and small interest group, while the
benefiting public will be scattered and poorly motivated (as the
40

For a discussion of the many ways in which the government voluntarily grants
benefits to individuals, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 Yale
L.J. 547 (2001).
41
Farber’s article does not rely solely on the public choice or rent-seeking account
presented here; indeed, Farber acknowledged the plausibility of other economic explanations for the compensation requirement. Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis
and Just Compensation, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 125 (1992).
42
Id. at 131–32.
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benefits for any individual member of the public will be small).43 In
such cases, Farber suggests that the payment of compensation is
necessary to alleviate the de facto veto power of the powerful
property owner interest group by paying it off.44 Compensation, in
other words, is a bribe to pay off the powerful obstructionist minority opposition.
Farber’s theory runs into several problems when measured up
against the current legal regime. First, and most importantly, Farber’s theory does not explain why it is necessary to mandate compensation by law. If Farber is right, the constitutional compensation requirement is superfluous. There is no need to mandate
compensation legally because the government will always choose
to pay compensation of its own accord in order to carry out efficient projects. It is interesting to note that this outcome stands in
diametric opposition to the predictions of the fiscal illusion theory
that assumes that the government will never pay compensation
unless legally forced to do so. At best, in Farber’s world, the compensation requirement can be seen as the government conceding in
advance the inevitable to the politically powerful.
Second, and relatedly, compensation at market value—the prevailing compensation measure—is anomalous to Farber’s analysis.
If, as Farber suggested, the goal of compensation is to appease politically powerful homeowners, there is no reason to suppose the
payment of market value will take care of the problem. At first
blush, property owners will only be indifferent to the government
action if they are reimbursed at the full subjective value they attach
to the property. Otherwise, they will find the taking disadvantageous and will be motivated to oppose the taking. But further
analysis from a game theory viewpoint shows there is no reason for
targeted homeowners to suffice with subjective value compensation. It is much more realistic to assume that once they understand
their power to hold out and block the project, they will require the
payment of the largest amount they can extract from the government. This amount will be commensurate with the group’s political

43

Id. at 130–31.
Id. at 125 (“Public choice theory suggests that legislators normally offer compensation to landowners whose property is taken for a project, because they would form a
powerful lobby against the project if not ‘bought off.’”).
44
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power and could range from zero to the full value of the project to
society.
Finally, Farber’s analysis is incapable of explaining why compensation ought to be paid in all those cases in which the affected
property owners do not wield sufficient political influence to block
the taking. On Farber’s view, the payment of compensation in such
cases is not only unnecessary but also a waste of resources. Farber’s analysis proceeds on the assumption that all owners of taken
properties are politically powerful, but in many cases this assumption does not seem to comport with reality.
3. Multiple Interest Groups
Like Farber, Timothy Brennan and James Boyd focused on the
political power of landowners as one of the central concerns in examining the likelihood that politicians will decide to take property.45 Brennan and Boyd’s model, however, sought to make the
analysis more comprehensive. Their model included a number of
additional factors: it explicitly viewed politicians as self-interested
and included the political power of members of the public seeking
regulation (referred to as environmentalists) as well as taxpayers.46
In addition, Brennan and Boyd addressed the incentive effects of
compensation on landowners’ development decisions, a factor extrinsic to our analysis.47
Compensation, in Brennan and Boyd’s model, acts in a manner
reminiscent of the Farber model. Compensation reduces landowner opposition to regulation. If compensation is high enough,
landowners will even support regulation that harms land values.
Brennan and Boyd add a peculiar observation as well: landowners
can also be forced to pay a penalty whenever land use is regulated.
If landowners are forced to pay a penalty tax regulation rather than

45
Timothy J. Brennan & James Boyd, Political Economy and the Efficiency of
Compensation for Takings, 24 Contemp. Econ. Pol’y 188, 190–95 (2006).
46
Id. at 191–93.
47
Id. at 195. For discussions of the problem that compensation may create “moral
hazard” and incentivize over-development, see Abraham Bell, Not Just Compensation, 13 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 29, 35 (2003); Paul Burrows, Compensation for
Compulsory Acquisition, 67 Land Econ. 49 (1991); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen
Segerson, Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 23 J. Legal
Stud. 749, 750 (1994).
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getting compensation—that is, if they are kicked while they are
down by being forced to pay a sum to the government in addition
to losing value through regulation—they can be induced to oppose
regulation which they would otherwise accept.48 Brennan and Boyd
then asked how much compensation should be granted (or how
much of a penalty assessed) in order to assure that government will
reach socially optimal regulatory decisions.
Brennan and Boyd’s model assumed that politicians seek at all
times to maximize political support. In the regulatory takings puzzle, politicians make regulatory decisions in order to maximize the
total political support emerging from three groups: taxpayers, environmentalists, and landowners. Compensation, in this world, affects political support from both landowners and taxpayers. Higher
compensation reduces landowner opposition to regulation while
increasing taxpayer opposition. Lower compensation increases
landowner opposition but reduces taxpayer opposition. Environmentalists are indifferent to compensation; in Brennan and Boyd’s
model, the environmentalists care only about the regulation.49
Brennan and Boyd determined that the resulting compensation
rule should depend on the expected political power (or “clout”) of
each of the three groups. If environmentalists and landowners have
equal clout, no compensation should be paid. If environmentalists
have considerably more clout, landowners should be penalized for
regulation in order to induce them to increase anti-regulatory efforts. Conversely, if landowners are much stronger than environmentalists, compensation must be paid to reduce their opposition
to regulation, as Farber observed. Full compensation, say Brennan
and Boyd, is only necessary when the balance of clout between
taxpayers (paying full compensation) and environmentalists would
lead to optimal outcomes.50 In such a case, the full compensation
neutralizes landowners and leaves politicians to maximize political
support from environmentalists and taxpayers through optimal
regulation.

48

See Brennan & Boyd, supra note 45, at 196, 200.
See id. at 190.
50
See id. at 191, 197.
49
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Paul Pecorino modified Brennan and Boyd’s model slightly by
changing two assumptions.51 First, he assumed that compensation
would always be positive.52 In other words, he disclaimed the possibility that government could ever kick property owners when they
are down by taxing victims of a taking. Second, his model assumed
only two relevant groups—landowners and environmentalists—
each of which doubled as taxpayers.53
Pecorino’s model, however, reached even more confusing results
as a consequence of a number of other factors his model examined.
Pecorino focused on regulations that are public goods but spread
benefits in an uneven manner. In Pecorino’s model, taxpayers bear
burdens equally in their role as taxpayers, but not in their roles as
regulatory beneficiaries and burdenees. Finally, Pecorino’s model
included the possibility that government might be biased (or unbiased) in favor of one or the other groups, as well as the possibility
that taxes might (or might not) distort social welfare.54
Pecorino’s model ultimately revolves around three questions:
what is the level of bias (if any) of the government, what is the distribution of benefits among groups in the population, and how
much (if at all) does raising revenue through taxation involve
deadweight loss? As one might guess, the last of these questions
proves pivotal in the model. Where taxation creates deadweight
loss, compensation obviously is costly and should be used only to
the degree necessary to overcome government bias. Where bias is
small, no compensation should be offered at all. Conversely, where
taxation creates no deadweight loss, issues of government bias fall
away and the optimality of compensation depends on the distribution of regulatory benefits. In essence, regulatory benefits constitute partial compensation for regulatory burdens, so compensation
should only be “full” where the burdenees of the regulation receive
no regulatory benefit. Otherwise, compensation should be reduced
in order not to incentivize excessive regulation. Interestingly, “full”

51

Paul Pecorino, Optimal Compensation for Regulatory Takings (Univ. of Ala.
Econ., Fin. & Legal Studies Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-04-01,
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1392927.
52
See id. at 4, 6–7.
53
See id. at 1, 4.
54
Id. at 1.
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compensation for Pecorino means compensation net of taxes,55 so
that regulatory burdenees might be entitled to gross compensation
in excess of losses.
4. Rent-Seeking
By contrast with the theories described earlier, Richard Epstein’s theory of takings is not generally associated with public
choice analysis. In his controversial and magisterial Takings, Epstein argues that the Takings Clause of the Constitution embodies
a principled view of limited government and its private property in
which all persons have a moral claim to their property and the
wealth that their property produces.56 Drawing on the theories of
John Locke, Epstein posits that optimally, government should not
only refrain from interfering in private property, but also should
grant to private property owners their share of many kinds of benefits created by government action utilizing that property. In Epstein’s words, the compensation requirement “guarantee[s] a proportionate distribution of the gain [created by government action]
among all of the parties from whom the government takes private
property.”57 This guaranty ensures that the government remains
within its “proper” bounds and that it seizes private property by
eminent domain (or any other kind of taking) and devotes it to
public use only where it is truly reasonable to believe that the
owner would consent. It also ensures that government’s powers
strongly resemble those of private actors, which, according to Epstein, is only proper for a representative government.58
Epstein’s work also offers a controversial overarching theory of
the proper relationship of government to private property.59 Ep-

55

Id.
Epstein, supra note 2.
57
Id. at 15.
58
Id. at 12–13, 36.
59
See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 4, at 396–400 (attacking Epstein’s “libertarianism”); Thomas O. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1463, 1484–91 (1996) (describing Epstein as a “radical
anti-interventionist”); Mark Kelman, Taking Takings Seriously: An Essay for Centrists, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1829, 1829 (1986) (book review) (“Takings is a very poorly reasoned book; Epstein makes no serious substantive arguments for the positions he advances.”); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 279, 279–80 (1986) (book
56
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stein argues that aside from its ability to regulate or take property
for public benefit, the government must not have powers different
from those of private actors, and that those government powers
must themselves be interpreted, as much as possible, to leave the
private property owner in the situation in which she would find
herself absent government interference. Thus, when compensating
for takings, the government must pay the full subjective value of
the property in the hands of its owner. In the absence of reliable
mechanisms for determining the value, Epstein favors the payment
of bonuses, such as a ten percent addition to market value.60 Additionally, any surplus created by government ownership must be
shared with the owners whose property was taken.
While Epstein grounds his theory of takings compensation in a
philosophical theory of the proper role of government, he adds that
it has the added benefit of eliminating rent-seeking. Epstein’s proposed compensation scheme accounts for every dollar of government wealth associated with a taking (whether acquired by the taking itself or produced by government use of the property), and
therefore, according to Epstein, completely eliminates the possibility of rent-seeking because “there are no economic rents to seek.”61
It is important to insert here an explanation of the term “rents.”
Rents are non-competitive, non-market payments extracted by
politicians in exchange for exercise of their powers.62 Public choice
analysis sees rent-extracting activities as intrinsic to the business of
government. In the pessimistic view of public choice scholars, government powers are auctioned off to the highest bidder and are
employed toward that bidder’s desired end. Aside from the costs of
auctioning, avoiding detection, and the like, government activity
divides rents between interested bidders and politicians.63 While
Epstein’s work does not offer a full-throated endorsement of public choice theory, it certainly does worry about the possible misuse
of government powers and politicians’ extractions of rents. In reviewing Epstein’s book, Thomas Merrill identified this observation

review) (denouncing Takings as a “patchwork” that is “ahistorical,” is “not . . . developed,” and is not a “serious work of scholarship”).
60
Epstein, supra note 2, at 184.
61
Id. at 199.
62
See generally Mueller, supra note 29, at 333–35.
63
See Robert D. Tollison, Rent-Seeking: A Survey, 35 Kyklos 575, 575–79 (1982).
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regarding economic rents as the central contribution of Epstein’s
view of takings.64 To Merrill, Epstein’s basic argument is that any
government action that possesses an element of redistribution presents an opening for rent seeking, and a broad reading of takings—
together with a compensation policy that provides all adversely affected owners with subjective value plus an appropriate share of
the surplus—closes this opening.65 Thus, according to Merrill, Epstein’s book is best read as “an essay on public choice theory.”66
If Merrill’s reading of Epstein is correct, then we share Epstein’s
opinion that the takings compensation requirement aims at minimizing rent-seeking, with the obvious difference that our framework focuses on rent-extraction, as opposed to rent-seeking—a distinction we will explain presently.67 Yet, we maintain that Epstein’s
scheme of minimizing rent seeking is both too broad and too narrow.
On the one hand, dissipating the entire surplus created by government action in takings compensation does not guarantee optimal government decisionmaking. While Benjamin Hermalin has
argued elsewhere that compensation at the full level of societal
surplus will induce owners to develop their properties to the optimal level,68 it does not follow that the state will reach optimal decisions if forced to pay out the full surplus. Indeed, full dissipation of
social surplus and the inability to realize economic rents should
dissuade government actors from undertaking socially beneficial
takings. But more importantly, extraction of rents is possible even
where the beneficiaries of every government action are known in
advance. This is because government actors will enjoy the choice of
engaging in projects that enrich (already identified) private property owners or refraining from doing so. The ability of government
actors to bestow profits on private owners at their discretion permits politicians to confer those benefits for their own gain. One
should therefore expect the surpluses to be diverted from owners
to politicians, and the auction dynamic occasionally to lead to poli64

See Merrill, supra note 30, at 1585–87.
See id. at 1577–78.
66
Id. at 1578.
67
See infra Part II.
68
Benjamin E. Hermalin, An Economic Analysis of Takings, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org.
64, 65–66 (1995).
65
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ticians choosing projects sub-optimally to produce smaller societal
surpluses but greater personal gain for themselves.
On the other hand, Epstein’s formula is overly strict in demanding allocation of the full measure of surplus to owners in proportion to their contribution. Even if Epstein is right that precommitting the surplus to identifiable parties in advance of a taking guarantees that there will be no rents to seek, it is far from
clear from a public choice perspective why Epstein’s proposed allocation is the right one. Indeed, any pre-commitment of surplus—
whether proportionately to the affected owners as Epstein suggests, or to the poorest members of society as identified by some
index, or even to named persons like Jane Doe and John Smith—
should be enough to eliminate rent-seeking in this view. By this
measuring stick, Epstein’s choice is arbitrary. There are other ways
to dissipate the rents stemming from government takings and regulation of private property, and there is no a priori reason to adopt
Epstein’s solution to the problem.
In addition to these theoretical problems with Epstein’s approach, there is a very practical obstacle to its implementation.
Simply put, it is difficult to imagine that anyone can calculate in
advance the surplus to be created by government action. Even after the fact, it will be difficult to disentangle the effects of various
private and public actions and determine the magnitude of the surplus. In advance of government actions, such calculations will be
confounded by the additional element of speculation. Together,
these practical problems suggest that it is not realistic to aim at
eliminating rent seeking by pre-committing to distribute any societal surplus to affected property owners.
Finally, as we shall show in Part III, if Epstein’s theory is truly to
be understood as aiming at preventing rent-seeking, it makes a
very serious error in endorsing the payment of fixed bonuses as
proxy compensation for the subjective value owners attach to their
property. Indeed, as we will show, Epstein’s proposal would increase rather than decrease rent-seeking activity.
II. A RENT-MINIMIZING MODEL OF TAKINGS COMPENSATION
Having reviewed existing justifications for takings compensation
and pointed out their shortcomings, in this Part we develop a new
model for understanding the compensation requirement as a rent-
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minimizing device. Our central insight is that takings compensation
is a powerful device for neutralizing politicians’ incentives to utilize
the takings power corruptly in order to enrich themselves at the
public expense. Our model demonstrates that where property
owners lack political power, requiring that the state pay full compensation at the owner’s subjective value will reduce to a minimum
the politician’s incentive to act corruptly. We also show that where
property owners have political power, the compensation requirement cannot be proved to have this salutary effect, but whether
and how compensation affects political corruption is unknowable
in the abstract.
We can describe the basic intuition behind our models as follows. Where politicians seek to enrich themselves corruptly from
exercising the takings power, they do so by identifying two groups
of individuals ready to pay the corrupt politicians. The first group
is private property owners willing to pay to avoid having their private property taken. The second group is individuals willing to pay
to have property given to them by corrupt politicians or, at least, to
have corrupt politicians arrange to have the newly public property
available to them. The less loss private owners suffer as a result of
a taking, the less they will be willing to bribe politicians to forgo
corrupt exercises of the takings power. Those wishing to obtain
property or enjoy public property are not affected either way by
compensation because what concerns them is only how much they
will have to pay, not what the government must pay.
Our account draws on the insights developed in the scholarship
of public choice focused on rent seeking, pioneered by Gordon
Tullock,69 and developed by James Buchanan,70 Sam Peltzman,71

69
See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5
West. Econ. J. 224 (1967) (using economic modeling to show that the social costs of
tariffs and monopolies are larger than the literature indicates).
70
E.g., James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in Toward a Theory
of the Rent-Seeking Society 3, 3–15 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980) (shifting
the focus of the study of rent seeking to nonmarket interactions and institutions as
part of public choice theory).
71
E.g., Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. &
Econ. 211, 212–13 (1976) (developing a formal model of the “optimum size of effective political coalitions set within the framework of a general model of the political
process”).
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Gary Becker,72 and Anne Krueger,73 among others. It owes a special
debt to Fred McChesney’s discussion of rent extraction by means
of law.74 In Gordon Tullock’s view, government services are functionally items in commerce sold by decisionmakers to private bidders.75 McChesney helpfully extended Tullock’s model by describing the threat of adverse government action—such as tax
increases—as business threats used to extort payments.76 These
views, it should be emphasized, are not a normative view of government, but rather a pessimistic description of the existing motivation behind government actions, undesirable though the motivation may be. While the rent-seeking view is rightly disconcerting
for many, the theory provides an important explanation of various
persistent inefficiencies of government policies. More importantly,
it provides a guideline to the threats created by improvident design
of the authority of government institutions and, therefore, an important mode of analysis for those seeking to ensure that the state
pursue the public good.
We must also add that public choice analysis does not presume
that all “payments” to government officials come in the form of
naked bribes. Indeed, it is quite likely that in most contexts, even
thoroughly corrupt politicians will be unable to or unwilling to take
undisguised cash payments. Rather, corrupt politicians will seek to
get paid indirectly. The payments may take a variety of forms, such
as campaign contributions, business contracts with associates of the
politician, and so forth.
Our analysis proceeds from the observation that the government’s power to take private property and transfer it from one
owner to another is of considerable pecuniary value. In theory,
there is no limit to the value of assets that may be seized and trans72

E.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. Econ. 371 (1983) (presenting “a theory of competition among
pressure groups for political influence”).
73
E.g., Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64
Am. Econ. Rev. 291 (1974) (developing a model of competitive rent seeking for when
rents originate from quantitative restrictions upon international trade).
74
Fred S. McChesney, Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion (1997) [hereinafter McChesney, Money for Nothing]; Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J.
Legal Stud. 101 (1987).
75
See Tullock, supra note 69, at 228.
76
McChesney, Money for Nothing, supra note 74, at 55–66.
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ferred through the power of eminent domain. Accordingly, if the
government were not under a legal obligation to pay compensation
to aggrieved property owners, one can surmise that the eminent
domain power would be used much more frequently as a means of
extracting rents.
We argue that takings compensation helps reduce the incentives
for corruption by limiting the ability of politicians to extract
“rents” from takings. Rent-seeking accounts of government focus
on decisions motivated by rent-seeking interest groups or individuals who bid for government services. Politicians may derive rents
from their takings power in one of two ways: first, they may
threaten to take and demand payment from property owners in order to abstain from taking or, second, they may “offer” their services to property developers, allowing them to obtain coveted land
without paying the asking price of the owner. Both possibilities are
ubiquitous. Takings compensation, we show, reduces the first kind
of rent extraction, without adversely affecting the second kind.
To demonstrate the importance of the compensation requirement, we offer a model of a world where politicians are selfseeking and make their decisions based on their desire to extract
rents. Our model examines politicians’ decisions with and without
compensation. Our model includes the ability of private parties to
solicit and receive grants of property from the government. Our
model shows that where property owners are politically powerless,
a full compensation requirement is the best way to reduce corrupt
takings. It shows as well that the compensation requirement cannot
affect the motivations of private parties to solicit grants from the
government or the motivations of corrupt politicians to make these
grants; instead, these motivations must be separately dealt with by
another body of law. Finally, our model demonstrates that where
owners are politically powerful, all bets are off and it is impossible
to say whether compensation reduces or increases corruption.
Our model arrives at a very different conclusion than the interest
group models described in the previous Part largely because we focus on ordinary physical takings, rather than regulatory takings.
One of the distinguishing features of regulatory takings is that they
combine givings (regulatory benefits) and takings (regulatory
harms) in the same regulatory act. Ordinary physical takings, by
contrast, generally do not combine givings in the same act. For in-
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stance, where a state takes a person’s home in order to build an
army base, two separate acts impose the harm and create the benefit. The taking of the home by eminent domain imposes the harm.
The granting of the home to the army and the subsequent building
of the army base confer the benefit (create the giving). Our model
shows that this separation of givings and takings creates a situation
where requiring compensation will almost always reduce rentextraction.
We begin by presenting the assumptions on which our model is
based. We then describe the findings of our model. The formal
model itself appears in the Appendix. In the next Part, we illustrate
some of the implications of our model.
A. Assumptions
We present here a model of politicians’ takings decisions with
and without compensation. In our model, there are three types of
actors: property owners, property developers, and politicians.
Property owners are those in possession of assets and double as
voters. Developers are those desiring to acquire certain assets that
they do not own; developers also double as voters. Politicians have
the authority under the law to take assets from property owners
and convert them to public property that will be used to provide
services to the public (that is, to owners and developers), or to
transfer them to developers to serve as the developers’ private
property.
We emphasize that the term developers is a broad one and covers all those who enjoy the benefits of the property as a result of
the transfer of ownership. Thus, for example, where the state takes
the property of the owner and converts the property to a post office, the private citizens who benefit from the use of the post office
are, in the terminology of our model, developers.
Our model examines takings decisions property by property, on
the assumption that there is no inherent limitation on the number
of properties that can be taken. In our model, politicians make decisions on whether to take property on the basis of the utility they
realize from taking the particular property. Specifically, politicians
will seek to take property any time they realize positive utility from
the taking.

BELL&PARCHOMOVSKY: HIDDEN FUNCTION

2010]

Hidden Function of Takings Compensation

10/18/2010 8:49 PM

1697

This way of modeling politicians’ behavior differs from the usual
Peltzman models, in which politicians seek to maximize public support.77 Our decision to deviate from the usual assumption is supported by several reasons. First, majoritarian politics do not require that politicians obtain votes beyond the margin of victory.
While politicians may wish some additional votes beyond the
minimum for purposes of insurance, the number cannot be infinite.
Indeed, providing costly services for additional votes beyond the
minimum required for majority victory is wasteful.78 Second, public
support is best seen as a means to an end rather than an end in itself. Politicians realize utility from public office as a result of public
support, but their utility does not end there. Thus, it is more accurate to view politicians as seeking to maximize utility generally,
rather than votes. Moreover, as each political decision is discrete,
we feel it is best to analyze the utility of each decision.
Our model supposes that politicians’ ability to extract rents using
the takings power is subject to three major restraints. First, elections impose a de facto restriction on politicians’ ability to transfer
property. Excessive non-consensual takings of property may prevent politicians from being reelected, thus costing them their office.
We call this the electability restraint. This restraint is only meaningful in two cases: if a politician by his actions alienates a sufficiently large number of property owners by imposing a large
enough cost on each to lead them to vote the politician out of office, or if the politician alienates a smaller group of very powerful
developers or owners who wield sufficient political clout to convince enough voters to bar the politician from being reelected. As a
consequence of the latter case, we may essentially divide property
into two basic kinds: clouted properties and unclouted properties.
Clouted properties are those whose taking (or giving) induces a
substantial political reaction. Generally, this is because the clouted
properties are owned (or desired) by the politically influential. Unclouted properties are those that may be taken and given without
inducing any significant political response. Generally, this is be-

77

See Peltzman, supra note 71, at 214.
See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent 283–95
(1962).
78
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cause the unclouted properties are owned by the politically marginalized.
Second, our model subjects politicians to what we call the legality restraint. In our model, certain kinds of explicit rent extractions—such as the taking of bribes—are illegal and punishable.
Politicians must therefore hide the rents to avoid prosecution, such
as by extracting rents indirectly in the form of campaign contributions.
Third and finally, we impose a transactional restraint on politicians in our model. Arranging rents and holding auctions for rentseeking activity require the politicians’ investment of time, information gathering, and administration. These transaction costs attend every rent-extraction initiative. Relatedly, politicians will have
to invest some money in identifying properties from which rents
can be extracted. Consequently, politicians will avoid activities that
promise rents that are too small to justify the cost of seeking them.
In our model, politicians attempt to maximize their private returns from their state powers by selling off exercises of their political powers. Every piece of private property in the state is, at least
theoretically, under threat of taking, and is therefore potentially
the subject of a politician’s sale of her taking power. At any moment, politicians may threaten to use their powers and “sell” a veto
over that power to the property owner.
Thus, the politician’s decision to threaten to take (or actually to
take) any given property can be expressed as an examination of
whether the politician is likely to realize positive utility as a result
of the threat or taking, where the positive utility consists of rents
extracted by the politician, net of electability, legality, and transaction restraints. The rents extracted by the politician will be some
percentage (probably less than one hundred percent) of the potential loss to the owner in the event of the taking.
B. Findings of Our Model
1. Unclouted Properties
In our model, corrupt politicians examine any given property for
the possibility of earning rents. These rents can be extracted from
two sources: owners and developers. The maximum amount of rent
that an owner will pay is the value of avoiding an unwanted taking
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or implementing a desired taking. That is, owners will pay some
number up to the absolute value of the difference between the
value they attach to the property (the subjective value to the
owner) and the compensation they receive for the taking. Let us
imagine that Olivia, the owner, values Blackacre at $1 million. Peter, the corrupt politician, seeks to extract rents from Olivia. If Peter threatens to take Blackacre, and no compensation is paid,
Olivia will pay the corrupt Peter up to $1 million for a credible
promise not to take Blackacre. If compensation is $500,000, Olivia
will be willing to pay a rent of at most $500,000. If Peter demands
$700,000 to forgo the taking, Olivia is better off allowing the government to take the property, collecting her compensation and suffering the loss of $500,000, rather than paying the $700,000 bribe. If
the compensation is $1.2 million, however, Olivia herself may have
an opportunity to engage in corruption. She may ask the corrupt
Peter to take the property, and promise Peter a payment of up to
$200,000 to encourage the taking.
The developer, meanwhile, operates under a different calculus.
The maximum amount of rent that a developer will pay is the difference between the value of acquiring the property (through a
government taking and transfer) and any charge assessed by the
government for the giving. Here, imagine that David, the developer, values Blackacre at $900,000. If Peter is willing to arrange for
the taking and transfer of Blackacre to David at no charge, David
will willingly pay the corrupt David up to $900,000 to affect the
taking and giving. If the law requires charging David $500,000 for
the property, the maximum bribe David will pay goes down to
$400,000. Any amount beyond that will deter David from engaging
in the transaction.
In evaluating these sources of rents, politicians must take account of two facts: first, politicians are unlikely to be able to extract
the full amount of potential rent and, second, politicians face costs
in extracting rents. Corrupt politicians do not act alone. Corrupt
rent-seeking activities will almost certainly require partners. As a
result, we can guess that it is rare that politicians will enjoy the full
“benefit” of the potential pool for rent extraction. Rather, we
should consider that politicians would, at best, realize in rents some
percentage of the amount owners and developers are willing to
pay.
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In addition, as we described earlier,79 politicians must consider
electability costs, as well as legality costs and transaction costs. If
the properties are unclouted, electability costs become zero. We
may therefore focus, in the first instance, on properties for which
there are no such costs.
As demonstrated in the Appendix, within these constraints, we
can conclude that guaranteed compensation at subjective value will
minimize the number of takings or threatened takings motivated
by rent extraction. Quite simply, this is because the pool for owner
bribes dries up when compensation equals subjective value.
On the one hand, if the law sets the compensation standard
above subjective value, politicians may profit by offering owners—
in exchange for rents—the chance to have their properties taken,
and likewise property owners will pay politicians to take their
property. The amount by which the compensation exceeds subjective value will constitute pure profit for the owner, which she will
readily share with the accommodating politician. On the other
hand, if the law sets the compensation standard below subjective
value, politicians may profit by extorting from owners shares of the
value of the threatened property in exchange for refraining from
taking the property. The amount by which subjective value exceeds
compensation constitutes pure loss for the owner, who will readily
buy an amount lower than that loss to avoid the taking. Correspondingly, property owners who fear that the government might
take their property may bribe the government in order to block it
from exercising its eminent domain power.
When owners are assured of receiving full compensation, there is
no reason for them to submit to corrupt politicians’ threats. In a
world without compensation, the value of a politician’s threat to
seize property is the full subjective value of the asset to the owner.
Once the owner is guaranteed compensation, however, the value of
the threat is greatly reduced. Indeed, if owners are guaranteed subjective-value compensation any time their property is taken, they
will be indifferent to threats of taking. As far as the owners are
concerned, so long as guaranteed compensation truly reflects the
value they attach to the asset, they should allow the assets to be
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See supra Section II.A.
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taken with equanimity. The extortion threat thus becomes worthless.
One of the most curious findings of our model is the fact that
developers’ willingness to pay rents to encourage takings and subsequent givings of the properties does not affect the result that
compensation at subjective value is optimal. As highlighted in controversial cases such as Kelo v. City of New London80 and Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,81 many of the properties
taken by eminent domain are forked over to private parties.82 In
addition, even where taken properties remain under government
ownership, it is almost inevitable that some private parties will enjoy greater benefit from use of the asset than they did prior to the
taking. Consequently, even when developers are not formally part
of the takings equation, they are an important part of the political
decision.
Simply stated, the results of our analysis are not changed by the
fact that politicians may extract rents by giving property as well as
by taking it.83 Indeed, within the constraints of our model, the ability to extract rents by givings should not be expected to alter in any
way the utility of compensation in reducing rent-extracting activities. It is true, of course, that givings expand the possibilities for extracting rents; politicians can demand payment from givings recipients in exchange for granting them property or property amenities.
Once givings enter the picture, a model of takings compensation
must take account of three sets of actors: not merely politicians and
property owners, but also potential property recipients (developers, in our shorthand). Thus, once developers enter the analysis,
government rent extraction is no longer confined to interactions
80
545 U.S. 469 (2005) (finding that there was no basis for exempting economic development from the broad definition of “public purpose” and allowing a developer to
acquire properties by eminent domain for the construction of a retail and residential
complex).
81
304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (holding that the city did not abuse its discretion in
condemning properties in order to convey the land to a private company for the creation of an industrial site that would create jobs and promote the public welfare).
82
See Krier & Serkin, supra note 7, at 859–60. For views critical of the lax public use
doctrine employed by courts in these cases to uphold the takings, see Epstein, supra
note 2, at 161–81; Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings after Kelo, 15 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. 183 (2007).
83
For a general discussion of the problems of givings, see Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 40.
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with property owners. The government can auction off its eminent
domain and regulatory power to developers to facilitate various
construction projects for them. Likewise, developers can initiate
transactions with politicians to this end.
We include developers in our model alongside owners and politicians in the following manner: developers wish to have property
that they do not currently own. One way of acquiring the property
is straightforward. Developers may offer to purchase the property
from the owners, and if they can agree on the price and terms of
the sale, developers and owners can complete the transaction on
their own. Alternatively, developers may attempt to utilize the
politicians’ coercive powers. Instead of paying owners to transfer
the property, the developers can prevail upon politicians to force
the transfer of the property in two steps: first, by taking the property by eminent domain and then by transferring it at less than
market value (or even for free) to the developers. This latter
method, of course, is ripe for rent-extraction. Before entering into
a more precise analysis of the opportunities for corruption in a
rent-seeking model with developers, we should emphasize again
that a formal transfer of title to the developers is not necessary. For
instance, when cities build stadiums for professional sports teams
after taking properties by eminent domain, the city often retains
title to the sports facility, while renting it to the sports team at an
attractive price.84 Indeed, for this reason, our model is able to treat
property that continues to be held by the state as simply a variant
of developer-motivated takings, at least in the eyes of the corrupt
politician.
In our model, developers do not alter the takings compensation
result because developers are in a very important sense irrelevant
to the takings question. Developers are interested only in the giving; they are indifferent to the question of how the state acquires
the property. Consequently, the existence of developers willing to
84

See Philip Weinberg, Eminent Domain for Private Sports Stadiums: Fair Ball or
Foul?, 35 Envtl. L. 311, 315 (2005) (explaining that the land needed for municipallyfinanced sports stadiums is often acquired through eminent domain); see also Roger
G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, “Build the Stadium—Create the Jobs!,” in Sports, Jobs,
and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Stadiums 1, 7–8 (Roger G.
Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997) (explaining that local government often pays for
acquiring the land, most of the site preparation, and some of the stadium construction
costs before leasing it to a sports team).
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pay for property title or amenities affects the takings equation primarily in two ways: (a) by increasing politicians’ abilities to extract
rents from the property after the state acquires it; and (b) by altering the political costs associated with the taking. Neither effect
should be exacerbated by a compensation requirement. Consequently, a compensation requirement should generally reduce rentextracting activity, even in a world where givings are frequent and
essentially unrestricted.85
Once we treat developers separately, we can see that developers’
desire to obtain property in exchange for rents cannot be affected
by takings compensation. Instead, developers will be affected
solely by the charges assessed by the state in exchange for the givings. Where the givings charge equals the value that the developer
attaches to the property, the politician’s ability to extract rents will
be reduced to a minimum. Any value less than the subjective value
the developer attaches to the property will create a greater incentive for rent-motivated takings.
2. Clouted Properties
Until now we have presumed that there are no electability restraints on politicians’ takings powers. This is doubtless true in
some cases: there are many property owners who are politically
powerless and may be easily preyed upon by corrupt politicians. It
is obviously not true, however, that all owners are politically powerless. In some cases, the taking of a property may induce a political backlash. This backlash imposes an additional cost on corrupt
politicians that may deter them from taking, even where compensation is lower than subjective value.
Unfortunately, our model shows that there is no way of knowing
what the compensation policy should be for such clouted proper85

Admittedly, were there absolute symmetry in transaction costs between property
owners and developers, the existence of givings would eliminate the need for takings
compensation. Property would be allocated optimally even without takings compensation and givings charges: any threat to take and give the property would result in an
auction between equally situated owners and developers and result in a win for the
superior property holder. Brennan and Boyd reached a similar result. Brennan &
Boyd, supra note 45, at 191 (finding that where landowners and those in favor of land
use regulations (e.g., environmentalists) have equal political influence, the social optimum is reached without a need for takings compensation). But transaction costs are
almost never symmetric, and this result is not likely to ever occur in the real world.
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ties. In some cases, the optimal compensation might be zero, as
that number would produce a significant enough backlash to ensure no rent-induced takings threats. In other cases, the optimal
compensation might be as high as subjective value, since the political backlash will never be enough to alter the usual rent-seeking
calculus of the corrupt politician.
This finding—that there is no optimal amount of compensation
for deterring rent-motivated takings and threats when properties
are clouted—is identical to that of Paul Pecorino as described in
Part I.86 If there were a sound way to identify such clouted properties in advance, it might be possible to exempt them from the usual
compensation requirements. However, it is difficult to imagine how
such properties could be identified in advance, and it is yet more
difficult to imagine what compensation policy the law should institute for such properties.
3. Findings Summarized
Takings compensation plays a vital role in deterring takings and
takings threats motivated by corrupt politicians’ desire to extract
rents from property owners. Where owners of property lack political power to oppose takings, such rent-motivated takings and
threats are most greatly reduced when owners are guaranteed
compensation at the full subjective value of their property. Where
owners have the political power to oppose takings, the effect of
compensation on rent-motivated takings and threats is unpredictable.
Takings compensation does not affect politicians’ rent-extracting
activity vis-à-vis developers. Such rent-extracting activity is minimized where developers are required to pay a givings charge equal
to the value the developer attaches to the property. However, the
willingness of corrupt politicians to take property in order to satisfy
the desires of developers does not alter the desirability of compensation at owners’ subjective value.

86

See supra Subsection I.B.3.
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III. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
In this Part, we explore some of the further normative implications of our model, as well as some of the limiting assumptions. We
have already observed that as far as rent extraction from property
owners is concerned, the optimal measure is subjective value. Further, we have seen that no compensation measure can effectively
eliminate rents in interactions between politicians and developers.
Rent seeking may only be ameliorated by a givings law that will
impose a fair charge on developers commensurate with the gains
they stand to receive from harnessing the government’s eminent
domain power to advance various development projects.
We now turn to three other sets of implications of our rentextraction understanding of takings compensation. First, we further
refine our discussion about takings compensation to identify cases
where practical reasons dictate anchoring compensation at market
value rather than subjective value. In such cases, we show that paying compensation at a fixed bonus above market value as a proxy
for subjective value, as suggested by some commentators, can be
counterproductive. Second, we offer some observations about how
to frame the kinds of government actions that should be subjected
to required compensation. Specifically, we show that suggestions
that government actions should be aggregated over a long period
of time to offset compensation are potentially very harmful in a
rent-seeking world. Third, we show why a private takings insurance
mechanism cannot be developed in a world of rent seeking. In offering this explanation, we seek to contribute to a small economic
analysis of takings literature that explores the necessity of compensation as a publicly-provided insurance for private losses created by
the exercise of eminent domain.87
87
See Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An
Economic Analysis, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 569 (1984) (evaluating the arguments for and
against compensation as a form of insurance against regulatory takings); Lawrence
Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, The Taking of Land: When Should
Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q.J. Econ. 71 (1984) (questioning whether compensation
for eminent domain takings is efficient); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings,
Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. Legal Stud. 269 (1988) (exploring noncompensation and insurance models); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L.
Rev. 509 (1986) (addressing the impact of transitional government policy in connection with takings and other economic reforms).
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After exploring these three implications, we turn to two limiting
assumptions within our model. These limiting assumptions concern
the inability to craft a compensation policy to limit corrupt takings
of clouted properties, as well as the costs of a compensation system
as a mechanism for combating corruption.
A. Market Value Compensation and the Dangers of
Overcompensation
In our model, we demonstrated that optimal compensation for
takings is the subjective value of property to the owner. It is particularly worth noting that because this optimal compensation is at
precisely subjective value, excessive compensation can be just as
much a problem as insufficient compensation. When compensation
is excessive, politicians will seek to take property in order to extract rents. In such cases, the primary rent-seeking activity is no
longer the threat of inadequately compensated takings. Rather, the
relevant activity is extracting rents from owners interested in having their properties taken in order to benefit from the inflated
compensation package. In our rent-seeking model, there is no reason to believe that the one activity is any more harmful or distortive than the other.
This has important implications for the proposal that payment of
fixed bonuses in addition to market value should be used as proxies
for subjective value. Adding such bonuses is likely to create rents,
and some scholars have suggested paying a fixed bonus over market value.88 Indeed, as we noted, Richard Epstein suggested offering such bonuses as a solution to rent-seeking takings.89 Additionally, a number of jurisdictions have done so in the past, and
continue to do so today. In Indiana, for example, when an owneroccupied residence is taken, compensation must be paid at 150% of
market value.90 Missouri grants 125% of market value for compen-

88

See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 Mich. St. L.
Rev. 957, 958–59 (2004).
89
See supra Subsection I.B.4.
90
Ind. Code Ann. § 32-24-4.5-8(2)(A) (2006).
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sation when a “homestead” is taken and 150% when a “heritage”
property is taken.91 In our model, such rules are gravely mistaken.
The dangers posed by such bonus compensation are in some
ways even greater than those of undercompensation. As we have
noted, one of the costs that politicians must take into account in extracting rents from properties is the cost of identifying candidates
for takings. Under current law, in which compensation at market
value for takings is guaranteed, politicians must identify properties
for which such compensation is likely to be significantly less than
subjective value, and then determine if a rent can be extracted, net
of electability, legality, and transaction costs. Where takings are
overcompensated, however, the politician’s task is considerably
eased. She need no longer invest much effort in identifying properties for takings. Instead, unscrupulous owners who are interested in
exploiting the generous compensation scheme will themselves approach the politicians and identify their properties as candidates
for takings.
But subjective value is not an easy standard for the law to realize. While owners know how much value they attach to their continued ownership of their properties, others do not. Generally, subjective value is neither observable nor readily ascertainable by
third parties; only the aggrieved property owners know the true
value of their property. In fact, the case law is quite explicit in acknowledging that eminent domain law has compromised its goal of
full compensation and adopted a standard of market value compensation instead for purely practical reasons—that is, “[b]ecause
of serious practical difficulties in assessing the worth an individual
places on particular property at a given time . . . .”92
This gives rise to a danger that courts asked to determine subjective value may overestimate or underestimate subjective value.
Like the dangers of overcompensation and undercompensation,
systematic errors of the courts do not result in symmetric dangers.

91
Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 523.039(2)-(3) (2006). For further examples, see Daphna
Lewinsohn-Zamir, Identifying Intense Preferences, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1391, 1408–09
(2009).
92
United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979); see also United
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943) (explaining that, for practical reasons,
“courts early adopted, and have retained, the concept of market value” in determining takings compensation).
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If courts are known systematically to overcompensate, even for a
certain class of properties, unscrupulous owners will put themselves forward as candidates for takings. This will, again, reduce
the corrupt politician’s cost of identifying a property to take, and
increase the likelihood of a rent-seeking taking.
Liquidity concerns may be particularly important in this respect.
It must be recognized that for many owners the home constitutes
the most important potential source of funds, but one that is highly
illiquid. Simply put, houses are not as easy to transform into cash
as bank accounts. If courts are not inclined to include liquidity concerns in evaluating subjective value, this may lead to a serious danger of excessive takings in difficult financial times. When they experience insolvency or liquidity distress, a significant number of
property owners will likely agree to receive less than what they
would ordinarily consider the full subjective value when their
property is taken, so long as they can receive the entire amount to
be paid as quickly as possible. If courts are inclined to overestimate
subjective value due to their ignoring liquidity distress, property
owners who are pressed for liquidity will be able to receive a
higher return on their property with a taking than they would in a
voluntary market transaction. Realizing this, the government may
auction off takings to owners with pressing liquidity needs in thin
markets and extract rents from them in exchange for supplying
them with liquidity. Since owners will receive a lesser amount in
the open market—or may not be able to sell the property at all—
they may prefer to forego a portion of their subjective value surplus and offer it to politicians to have their properties taken.
In light of all these dangers of overcompensation, an argument
can be adduced in favor of market compensation as the best proxy
for subjective value. While it is true that in most cases payment at
market value will undercompensate owners, so long as the difference between subjective value and market value is small, this danger should be preferred to the danger of overcompensating owners.
Simply put, when politicians and courts cannot readily identify the
property owners who place a high subjective value on their properties, compensation at subjective value will create a situation in
which all property owners will misrepresent themselves as owners
with high subjective value. When this happens, the administrative
costs of separating the owners who truly have large surplus subjec-
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tive values from those who value their properties at close to market
value will be significant.
Under this state of affairs, it will make sense to compensate at
market value for two related reasons. First, since politicians cannot
readily identify those owners with high subjective value, they cannot easily engage in rent extraction because they will not readily
know which property owners to target. This means that the risk of
rent extraction is likely to be very small in such a scenario. Second,
the cost of screening for the owners with the high subjective value
from the larger pool of owners is going to be significant. This
means that the benefits derived from compensation at subjective
value may be drowned out by the screening costs stemming from
such a system. These two effects combine to establish a prima facie
case for compensation at market value.
B. Framing Rent-Seeking Transactions
Our rent-minimization perspective also has important implications for the issue of “framing” the taking. There is an ongoing debate about what actions should be taken into account when deciding whether and how much to compensate. When the government
takes away Bob’s title to property A, but in doing so also creates
benefits for Bob’s property B, should compensation reflect only
the effect on property A, or also on property B? What if today’s
regulatory taking results in the elimination of ninety percent of the
value of A, but yesterday’s government action created that same
ninety percent due to a regulatory benefit? Should the taking be
“framed” so as to allow the giving and taking to offset each other?
In a thought-provoking article, Daryl Levinson addressed the
framing problem and its relation to the government’s general practice of paying compensation for takings but not assessing charges
for givings.93 Levinson observed potential unfairness in forcing the
government to pay compensation for actions and regulations that
reduce property value, even though the government does not get to
collect a corresponding payment whenever its actions increase
property value.94 Levinson argued that this asymmetry is problem93
Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 Yale L.J.
1311 (2002).
94
Id. at 1338.
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atic because it is often prior government acts and planning that
create much of the value the government is required to compensate property owners for when it subsequently takes or regulates
certain properties.95 Levinson therefore suggested that courts consider prior government acts within the same “frame” as the government taking and give the government “credit” for past, valuecreating acts and regulations when considering the proper compensation to be paid for a taking.96 More broadly, Levinson proposed
that the legal system adopts a broad framing approach that will reduce the government’s obligation to compensate.97
Our model demonstrates a significant danger in this proposed
approach. Instead, our model supports a narrow framing of constitutional transactions. In our model, every moment represents a
new opportunity to engage in rent-seeking takings or threats. Including multiple government actions in the “frame” of a taking for
purposes of measuring compensation leaves intact all the rentseeking opportunities for government givings, while increasing the
rent-seeking opportunities associated with takings. Consider, for
example, the following potential government actions that affect the
value of a single property. In year one, politicians consider whether
to approve a zoning variance permitting construction of multiple
family homes in a protected wetlands area. In year fifty, politicians
consider whether to nullify such variances in wetlands areas, and
require that all such lands be returned to a pristine state. Under
Levinson’s approach, if the government were to first grant the
variance and then cancel it, no compensation should be paid for
the value of the homes since the hand that gave was the same hand
that took away. However, an analysis that focuses on rent-creating
activities notes that both the giving and taking decisions are separate opportunities to extract rents. In year one, the politician can
extract payment from the owner in exchange for the variance. And
in year fifty, the politician can demand payment in exchange for
not taking the variance away. Indeed, if all takings transactions
were framed broadly, as Levinson suggests, those who previously
received government largesse would provide excellent targets for

95

Id. at 1315.
Id. at 1315–17.
97
Id. at 1340.
96
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extracting rents upon threat of taking back the previously bestowed largesse.
We may explain this result differently by returning more specifically to the findings of our model. As noted previously,98 our model
demonstrates that where the beneficiaries of givings are distinct
from the victims of takings, there is no way to alter the compensation number so as to reduce corrupt activities associated with givings. Our model assumes that the takings and givings are disassociated because we examine physical takings, in which property is
taken from one person and given to another. But even where the
same person is the recipient of the giving and the victim of the taking, the disassociated approach used by our model is preferable, so
long as the politician can disaggregate the results. This is because if
the politician has distinct takings and givings choices to make, each
one must be examined through its own utility calculus. Otherwise,
the corruptions created by givings will increase. Each giving will
provide an opportunity to extract rents while the politician creates
a class of future victims for further rent extraction.
C. Takings Insurance
One way of analyzing takings compensation is through the prism
of insurance, and our framework implicates this concept. In order
to explain this implication, we first offer a preliminary review of
the debate about private provision of takings insurance. In essence,
by paying compensation to owners any time it takes their property,
the government grants all property owners a publicly-provided insurance policy against the risk of future takings of their property.
This analysis of the essence of takings compensation is at the heart
of models offered by those such as Louis Kaplow99 as well as Lawrence Blume, Daniel Rubinfeld, and Perry Shapiro.100
The harm of such state-provided insurance is obvious: it creates
a moral hazard that encourages excessive development of property.101 So too, the benefit of such insurance, like all insurance, is
obvious. Takings insurance spreads risk and therefore reduces dis98

See supra Section II.B.
Kaplow, supra note 87.
100
Blume, Rubinfeld & Shapiro, supra note 87.
101
See id.
99
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utilities associated with property owners’ risk aversion.102 As others
have previously noted,103 the risk-aversion justification for takings
compensation suffers from serious flaws. If risk aversion is indeed a
problem, why not allow the market to provide a solution in the
form of private insurance, rather than government insurance?
Our rent minimization framework adds an additional argument
against the adoption of private insurance against takings. To see
why, it is crucial to understand that it is not only the power to take
that enables rent extractions, but also information about the identity of the specific properties that may be taken. Once politicians
identify the properties “to be taken,” they can sell the information
both to the relevant homeowners and the insurance companies.
Clearly, advance information about planned takings is valuable for
both groups. In the case of the homeowners, information about a
planned taking will send them to buy insurance on their homes. In
the case of the insurance companies, the information will have the
opposite effect, inducing the insurance company to engage in price
discrimination or turn the homeowners away.
In other words, the availability of a private insurance market
against takings risk creates a new market in which rents may be extracted for takings threats. At the same time, if homeowners are
compensated by insurance companies rather than the state, the
salutary effects of state-provided compensation on reducing rentseeking activities will be lost.
It is noteworthy that the ability of the government to trade in information about takings will exacerbate the adverse selection problem noted by William Fischel and is likely to cause the private insurance market against takings to unravel.104 Our analysis,
therefore, supports retention of the current system of government
provided insurance against takings. When the government is at
once the taker and the insurer, it dramatically reduces its ability to
profit from selling information about its planned action.

102

Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 87, at 572.
See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 87, at 603.
104
William Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics and Politics 191 (1995);
Fischel & Shapiro, supra note 87, at 286.
103
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D. Limiting Assumptions
We conclude this Part by exploring the implications of several of
the assumptions underlying our model.
1. Cloutedness
We begin with the sharp distinction our model draws between
clouted and unclouted property. Our claim that takings compensation helps combat corruption is restricted to unclouted properties,
that is, to properties whose taking would not arouse a significant
political reaction. By contrast, our model is unable to predict how
compensation would affect the motivation of corrupt politicians
regarding clouted properties, that is, properties whose taking
would arouse significant political reaction.105
Does this argue for a bifurcated takings rule in which only unclouted properties would have the right to full compensation, while
owners of clouted properties would have to fend for themselves
politically? We think not, for two reasons. By definition, the inability to set a compensation level that optimally reduces corrupt pressures regarding clouted properties can provide no stronger argument for zero compensation than full compensation. Any
compensation level set for clouted properties would necessarily be
arbitrary, and there is no good reason to believe that it would decrease incentives for corruption when compared to full compensation. Moreover, the very establishment of a bifurcated system, in
which owners would have to prove lack of clout in order to enjoy
full compensation, would create an unhealthy incentive for owners
to invest in proving that their properties are unclouted or in trying
to disguise clouted properties as unclouted. These expenditures
would necessarily be wasteful and it is difficult to imagine that they
would be entirely successful. After all, it is difficult to imagine how
owners could definitively prove the lack of political power associated with ownership of their property.
2. Socially Desirable Givings
In our analysis, corrupt politicians evaluate separately the possibility of extracting rents from owners and from developers. In our
105

See supra Section II.B.
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model, the willingness of developers to pay bribes for givings of
property will still encourage corrupt politicians to engage in rentmotivated takings, even if compensation policy is optimal. We suggest that incentives for rent-motivated givings can only be blunted
where the state requires developers to pay a charge in the magnitude of the subjective value the developers attach to the property.106
We should recognize, however, that assessing charges at the developer’s subjective value is not problem-free. If developers must
pay the state the full value they attach to property given to them,
they will be indifferent to the giving. Developers will no longer
seek to pay bribes to corrupt politicians for givings. But they will
also no longer seek any givings at all, whether motivated by corruption, or anything else. Any initiative for giving property in order to improve social welfare will have to come from publicly
minded politicians.
Thus, if we believe that some givings are desirable, and we believe they will only come about if developers demand them, we
should not rapidly embrace subjective-value charges. Rather, in
setting the level of charges to be paid by the developers we must
balance the desire to reduce corrupt givings on the one hand, with
the need to encourage socially beneficial givings on the other. Unfortunately, since our model focuses on reducing corruption, it
cannot specify the parameters for balancing good and bad givings.
If we believe that publicly minded politicians will be good at seeking out opportunities for socially beneficial givings, this need not
trouble us excessively.
3. Socially Desirable Takings
Assessing subjective value charges to developers threatens to
eliminate even socially beneficial givings. The reason for this is that
a developer who must pay a givings charge at the full subjective
value of the given property will be indifferent to the giving. Consequently, developers will never go out of their way to encourage givings, even where the givings would benefit society at large. By contrast, within the parameters of our analysis, granting subjective
value compensation to owners should not reduce socially beneficial
takings. Subjective value compensation should make owners indif106

See supra Section II.B.
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ferent to takings. The beneficiaries, however, will not be indifferent to the takings. As our analysis of givings shows, the beneficiaries’ interest in the taking will not be affected by compensation at
all.107 Additionally, publicly minded politicians should consider pursuing socially beneficial takings where they can be identified, irrespective of any beneficiary request.
This entire analysis, however, is premised on an assumption of
cost-free transfer payments. That is to say, we have presumed that
the act of compensating owners for the value of their taken properties does not entail any additional cost to society. In general, transfer payments do not, in and of themselves, affect total social welfare. Rather, they simply add welfare to one party in the same
amount as they lower it to another. But transfer payments are
rarely costless. Arranging for the transfer of funds from one person
to another entails potentially significant administrative costs. Once
we include these administrative costs in the picture, we must acknowledge that compensation decisions entail a balance between
the reduction in corruption created by subjective value compensation and the costs of administering the payment of compensation to
aggrieved owners. Corrupt rent-seeking activities are like other
crimes. Given the costs of preventing crime, society may find it
worthwhile to permit some crime to take place.
On a similar note, our model assumes a fixed background legal
approach to corruption, encapsulated in the “legality cost” a politician expects to pay for corrupt activities. In real life, such legality
costs can be altered by decisionmakers. Law enforcement officials
may devote greater efforts to locating and capturing criminals.
Lawmakers may refine the definition and scope of criminal offenses. The state may increase punishments and devote more resources to confining criminals. Thus, decisionmakers face an additional set of tradeoffs when considering compensation policy. If
raising funds for government action is costly and entails deadweight loss, decisionmakers must not only consider the costs of
administering compensation, they must also consider the possibility
of earning a better return on corruption-reduction by investing in
law enforcement and similar measures.

107

See infra Appendix, Proposition 3.
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These factors limit the scope of our model in some respects.
Nonetheless, we argue that the model provides important insight
into the utility of the compensation requirement and its ability to
fight rent seeking. At the very least, we can say that when deciding
on compensation policy, lawmakers must incorporate into their
calculus the importance of compensation in reducing corruption.
CONCLUSION
In this Essay, we developed a rent-minimization justification for
takings compensation. We showed that the compensation mandate
in the Fifth Amendment reduces the potential rents extracted and
sought by politicians, developers, and property owners. By reducing available rents, the compensation requirement mitigates the
danger of inefficient intervention in real property markets and
lowers wasteful expenditures on lobbying efforts.
We also examined the implications of our rent-minimization perspective for various policy issues such as optimal compensation
awards, how to treat past government actions that affected the
value of taken properties (an issue known in the literature as
“framing”), and the desirability of adopting a givings law and instituting private insurance against takings. Our main findings were
that the optimal compensation award for taken property should be
between the market value and the subjective value to the owner.
Another finding of our analysis was that a perfect solution that
would fully eliminate all possible rents is unattainable in this context. As for the framing issue, our rent-minimization analysis
clearly favors narrow framing that treats each government act on a
stand-alone basis. Our analysis also supports the adoption of a givings law as a way of further reducing rents.
Finally, our analysis cautions against substituting government
compensation with private insurance for takings. Although the discussion in the Essay is primarily theoretical, it has real world consequences in both the United States and elsewhere. The pursuit of
rents by politicians and government actors may dramatically destabilize property regimes. This risk is especially acute in developing
countries where private property is protected neither legally nor
informally by norms or traditions. Our analysis teaches that the enactment and enforcement of a compensation requirement for tak-
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ings can help discipline corrupt politicians and ameliorate the illeffects of rent extraction and seeking.
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APPENDIX: FORMAL MODEL
Our model proposes that a politician’s utility calculus for taking
any particular property can be represented by:
Up = α|Vo – Po| + β|Vd – Pd|

(1)

In this equation, Up represents the gross utility that the politician
may realize; Vo and Po the property’s value to the owner and the
compensation paid for taking, respectively; Vd and Pd the property’s value to the developer and the charge paid by the developer
for the grant of the property; and coefficients α and β, where 0 < α
< 1 and 0 < β < 1, each represent the inability of the politician to
appropriate the full gain and/or loss to the owners and developers.
This inability to estimate the full gain or loss is related, in large
part, to the inability of a politician to credibly commit never to take
a property after being bribed by an owner or never to fail to take
property after granting it to a developer.
The politician’s costs can be represented by:
C = ci + cp + cl + ce

(2)

In this equation, costs are cumulative and consist of the costs of
identifying properties to take (ci), costs of processing rent extractions (cp), costs of avoiding legal sanctions (cl), and the electability
costs of a taking, that is, the anticipated future losses as a result of
reduced chances of being reelected to office due to the taking
108
(ce).
The politician’s net utility for taking any given property can
therefore be represented by:
Up – C = α|Vo – Po| + β|Vd – Pd| – (ci + cp + cl + ce)

(3)

Formally, a politician will take a property when the politician’s
utility function for taking the property, net of costs, is positive, or
when:
Up(|Vo – Po|, |Vd – Pd|) – C > 0
108

Note that for unclouted properties, ce will be zero.

(4)
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Alternatively, when the return of this function is positive, the
politician can credibly threaten to take property without actually
carrying out the taking.
The utility function of extractable rents (Up) for the politician is
a function of the rents that can be extracted from each of the original owner, the developer (i.e., the potential recipient of the taken
property), and the state (if the taken property remains under state
ownership). For each of these actors, rents may only be extracted
from net gain or loss. Thus, extractable rents from the owner are a
function of the absolute value of the difference between value to
the owner and compensation received (∆o = |Vo – Po|). Extractable
rents from the developer are a function of the absolute value of the
difference between the value to the developer and any payment
rendered to the state for the property (∆d = |Vd – Pd|). Extractable
rents from the state are a function of the difference between the
value to the users of the property (the developers) and any payment the users make to the state. Thus, extractable rents may be
considered as similar to the extractable rents from developers,
since ultimately such rents may only be taken from users of the
property. We presume that the state will not itself pay rents.
We further presume that the extractable rents for each property
(independent of costs) strictly increase as the total value to the developer and/or to the owner increase, such that ∂U / ∂∆o ≥ 0, ∂U /
2
2
2
2
∂∆d ≥ 0, and ∂ U / ∂∆o ≥ 0, ∂ U / ∂∆d ≥ 0. Our assumption here is
based on the observation that there is no intrinsic reason why the
politician’s rent should diminish with the value realized or lost by
the owner/developer, but there is strong reason to believe that it
would. Setting aside the costs identified above, readiness to pay
rents will increase as the value realized or lost by the
owner/developer increases.
Potential costs in each case are represented by C, where C = ci +
cp + cl + ce. We assume that ci, cp, and cl are independent of the
compensation paid, such that ∂ci / ∂Po = 0, ∂cp / ∂Po = 0 and ∂cd / ∂Po
= 0. We make no similar assumption about the electability costs of
takings. In other words, ∂ce / ∂Po ≤ 0 and ∂ce / ∂Po ≥ 0 are both possible.
Within these parameters, we now show that there is an optimal
level of compensation that produces the minimum amount of rentinduced takings and threats of takings.
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Proposition 1: For unclouted properties, the closer the compensation approaches to subjective value, without exceeding it, the lower
the likelihood of rent-extracting takings and rent-extracting threats.
Proof: Under (4) above, politicians take when Up(|Vo – Po|, |Vd –
Pd|) – C > 0. As we have defined the terms, for unclouted properties, the value of C should remain static with increases or decreases
in Po, i.e., ∂C / ∂Po = 0.
At Po=0, the politician will take when:
αVo + β|Vd – Pd| – C > 0

(5)

Imagine now that Po = θ, where 0 < θ < Vo. The politician will
now take when:
αVo – αθ + β|Vd – Pd| – C > 0

(6)

Comparing (5) and (6), we can see that αVo + β|Vd – Pd| – C > αVo
– αθ + β|Vd – Pd| – C because αθ > 0. Thus, as Po approaches Vo, the
likelihood of the politician taking or threatening a rent-induced
taking decreases.
Proposition 2: For unclouted properties, the greater the compensation exceeds subjective value, the greater the likelihood of rentextracting takings and rent-extracting threats.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of proposition 1.
Here, imagine that Po = γ, where Vo < γ. The politician will now
take when:
αγ – αVo + β|Vd – Pd| – C > 0

(7)

By contrast, if Po = Vo, politicians will take when:
β|Vd – Pd| – C > 0

(8)
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Comparing (7) and (8), we can see that αγ – αVo + β|Vd – Pd| – C
> β|Vd – Pd| – C because α(γ –Vo) > 0. Thus, as Po exceeds Vo, the
likelihood of the politician taking or threatening a rent-induced
taking increases.
Proposition 3: For unclouted properties, compensation at subjective value produces the minimum likelihood of rent-extracting takings and rent-extracting threats (although this likelihood need not be
zero).
Proof: Proposition 3 follows directly from propositions 1 and 2.
Comparing (6) and (8), we can see that αVo – αθ + β|Vd – Pd| – C
> β|Vd – Pd| – C, since α(Vo – θ) > 0. Similarly, comparing (7) and
(8), we can see that αγ – αVo + β|Vd – Pd| – C > β|Vd – Pd| – C because α(γ –Vo) > 0. Thus, Up – C is at a minimum at Po = Vo, and
compensation at subjective level produces the minimum number of
rent-induced takings or threats of takings.
The intuition behind these three propositions may be explained
as follows. As noted above, politicians take when Up(|Vo – Po|, |Vd –
Pd|) – C > 0, or when Up(|Vo – Po|, |Vd – Pd|) > C. By definition, when
unclouted properties are taken, the net value of the taking to the
owner (∆o) has no effect on the political cost to the politician of
taking. Thus, the magnitude of Po is irrelevant to cp. Other elements of costs should not be affected by Po: none of the cost of
identifying properties, the likelihood of legal sanctions, or the cost
of processing rents should be affected by compensation. The value
of C should therefore remain static with increases in Po. Similarly,
compensation paid to the owner has no effect on the ability to realize rents from the developer. The net value of the giving to the developer (∆d) is affected only by the value of the property to the developer, and the charge the developer must pay to receive the
property. Thus, the sole determinant of the attractiveness of a taking or threatened taking to the politician is the extractable net
value of the taking to the owner (α∆o). This value is zero when the
owner is fully compensated for the taking (Po = Vo) and rises as the
owner is either over-compensated or under-compensated.
Having demonstrated that optimal compensation is set at the
subjective value of the property to the owner, we can now show
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that similarly, the optimal charge for giving property to developers
should be set at the subjective value of the property to the developer.
Proposition 4: For unclouted properties, the closer the givings
charge approaches to subjective value to the developer, without exceeding it, the lower the likelihood of takings motivated by rentextracting givings.
Proof: We begin again with (4) above, under which politicians
take when Up(|Vo – Po|, |Vd – Pd|) – C > 0.
At Pd = 0, the politician will take when:
α|Vo – Po| + βVd – C > 0

(9)

Imagine now that Pd = θ, where 0 < θ < Vd. The politician will
now take when:
α|Vo – Po| + βVd – βθ – C > 0

(10)

Comparing (9) and (10), we can see that α|Vo – Po| + βVd – C >
α|Vo – Po| + βVd – βθ – C because βθ > 0. Thus, as Pd approaches Vd,
the likelihood of the politician taking or threatening a rent-induced
taking decreases.
It is worth observing here that givings charges are, for the most
part, only a theoretical construct. As we have observed elsewhere,109 it is possible to construct a givings law that would impose
a “fair charge” requirement on developers. The “fair charge” requirement is the givings’ analogue to the “just compensation”
mandate in takings law. The “fair charge” requirement would force
developers to pay for government conferrals of benefits and thus
minimize their incentives to “buy” such services.110
We do not need to examine the effect of givings charges in excess of subjective value to the developer. This is because a developer would never willingly accept such a giving subject to such a
109
110

Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 40.
See id. at 615–17.
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charge, and, under current circumstances, it is difficult to envision
forced givings on such terms. However, we can show that the optimal charge is at subjective value to the developer.
Proposition 5: For unclouted properties, givings charges at subjective value to the developer produce the minimum likelihood of
takings motivated by rent-extracting givings (although this likelihood need not be zero).
Proof: The proof follows directly from the previous proposition.
First, let us note when the politician will take if Pd = Vd:
α|Vo – Po| – C > 0

(11)

If we compare (10) and (11), we can see that α|Vo – Po| + βVd – βθ
– C > α|Vo – Po| – C because β(Vd – θ) > 0. Thus, the minimum number of takings is reached as Pd = Vd.
Until now, we have examined only unclouted properties. For unclouted properties, C is unaffected by the amount of compensation
paid or givings charge assessed. It is therefore possible to see that
optimal compensation at subjective value (and optimal givings
charges at subjective value to the developer) achieve minimum
rent-seeking takings. However, matters change when property is
clouted. In such cases, C is affected by the compensation decision.
Quite simply, in such cases, the quantum of compensation paid to
the owners (or givings charge taken from the developer) affects the
electability cost to the politician (ce).
In such cases, without knowing the effect of compensation on
the electability cost to the politician, it is not possible to determine
the optimal quantity of compensation. Optimal compensation may
be zero, some number less than subjective value, some number
greater than subjective value, or subjective value.
Proposition 6: For clouted properties, compensation at any level
produces unpredictable effects on rent-extracting takings, and it may
reduce or increase likelihood of rent-extracting takings and rentextracting threats, depending on the effects of compensation on the
politician’s electability.

BELL&PARCHOMOVSKY: HIDDEN FUNCTION

1724

Virginia Law Review

10/18/2010 8:49 PM

[Vol. 96:1673

Proof: Once properties are clouted, the magnitude of Po becomes relevant to ce. Simply put, the likelihood that owners will
seek to extract a political price from the politician will increase as
∆o increases. The result is that the effects of compensation are unpredictable. While compensation reduces Up as Po approaches Vo, it
also may decrease C, depending on the magnitude of the political
effect of compensation. If the effect on C dominates, compensation
will increase the likelihood of rent-seeking takings. If the effect on
Up dominates, compensation will decrease the likelihood of rentseeking takings.
To see this, let us divide the cost function as follows:
C = C’ + ce

(12)

Where
ce = ε|Vo – Po|

(13)

and ε is a coefficient representing the political cost to be imposed
on the politician as a result of the loss suffered by the owner. We
should note that ε > 0, by assumption, but no upper bound of ε may
be stated. It is possible that the political losses experienced by the
politician may be greater or lesser than the value of the property to
the owner. As a result, equation (3) above can be rewritten as follows:
Up – C = α|Vo – Po| + β|Vd – Pd| – C’ – ε|Vo – Po|

(14)

In turn, we may say that the politician will take when:
(α–ε)|Vo – Po| + β|Vd – Pd| – C’ > 0

(15)

We may now return to our earlier proofs.
In proof 1, we were able to prove that αVo + β|Vd – Pd| – C > αVo
– αθ + β|Vd – Pd| – C because αθ > 0. However, we cannot prove that
(α–ε)Vo + β|Vd – Pd| – C > (α–ε)Vo – (α–ε)θ + β|Vd – Pd| – C because
it is possible that (α–ε) > 0 and that (α–ε) < 0.
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In proof 2, we were able to prove that αγ – αVo + β|Vd – Pd| – C >
β|Vd – Pd| – C because α(γ – Vo) > 0. However, we cannot prove that
(α–ε)γ – (α–ε)Vo + β|Vd – Pd| – C > β|Vd – Pd| – C because it is possible that (α–ε) > 0 and that (α–ε) < 0.
Our proof 3 depended on proofs 1 and 2, which is no longer
valid, where the politician’s decision is made according to (15),
rather than (4). Where ε > α, the likelihood of a rent-induced taking or threat may increase with compensation below subjective
value or above subjective value. However, where α > ε, proofs 1, 2,
and 3 still hold.
Not knowing the magnitude of ε, it is not possible to know anything about the optimal level of compensation.

